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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1629 
___________ 
 
DAVID V. ALSTON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KEAN UNIVERSITY; DR. PHILIP H. WITT; SARAH D. BLOOD  
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-01338) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 2, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 8, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David V. Alston appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  We will affirm.  
 
I. 
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 In February 2014, Alston filed a complaint in the District Court against Kean 
University (“Kean”); Dr. Philip H. Witt, a psychologist employed by Kean University; 
and Sarah D. Blood, a student at Kean University.  He alleged that he was charged with 
violating a “no contact order” with Blood, required to attend a “Student Conduct 
Hearing,” and then was suspended from Kean.  The hearing officer allegedly delayed 
issuing a decision for 29 days and, when the decision was issued, it specified that Alston 
was required to see Witt for a psychological evaluation.  During the psychological 
evaluation, Witt allegedly “exhibited partiality” based on the information contained in the 
10-page decision letter.  Alston later appealed his suspension and requested another copy 
of the decision letter, as he no longer had the original.  He asserts that Kean officials 
rewrote the letter, “deleting all of the Hearing Officer’s silly and defamatory statements” 
that formed the basis of Witt’s questions.  Alston claims that Kean and Witt conspired to 
violate his due process rights and engaged in libel and defamation of his character.   
  The District Judge reviewed the complaint and determined that the allegations 
made therein were substantially similar to allegations that Alston had raised in a separate 
civil suit, D.C. Civ. No. 2:13-cv-00309, which had been dismissed without leave to 
amend in June 2013.  Accordingly, the District Court summarily dismissed the complaint.  
Alston appeals. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s dismissal of Alston’s complaint.  See Tourscher v. 
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McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  A district court must sua sponte dismiss 
a complaint that is filed in forma pauperis if it determines that the action is frivolous, 
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages against a defendant who is immune 
from such relief.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).   
A plaintiff who has received a final judgment on the merits in one action is 
precluded from litigating another suit against the same parties based on the same cause of 
action.  See CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Whether two causes of action are identical depends, in general, on a consideration of: (1) 
whether the acts complained of and the demand for recovery are the same; (2) whether 
the same witnesses and documents will be necessary in the trial in both cases; and (3) 
whether the material facts alleged are the same.  See United States v. Athlone Indus. Inc., 
746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984) 
At the time that Alston filed his complaint, he had already been denied relief in a 
separate civil rights action docketed at D.C. Civ. No. 2:13-cv-00309.  In that separate 
complaint, as amended, he sued Kean, Witt, and Blood, and alleged that: (1) the hearing 
officer intentionally delayed issuing a decision letter; (2) Kean officials libeled him; and 
(3) Kean’s vice president and the Office of Student Conduct harassed him while he 
waited for the results of his appeal.  The District Court granted Kean and Witt’s motions 
to dismiss pursuant to Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
dismissed Alston’s state law claims against Blood for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
In her dismissal order, the District Judge denied Alston’s motion to file a second 
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amended complaint and noted that further amendment of the complaint would be futile.  
We affirmed in Alston v. Kean Univ., C.A. No. 13-2733 (judgment entered Dec. 19, 
2013).1   
The instant action stems from the same alleged harm caused by the same three 
defendants named in D.C. Civ. No. 2:13-cv-00309, does not identify any different 
defendants or harms, and was filed after the District Court had dismissed Alston’s 
amended complaint without further leave to amend.  The District Court therefore 
properly dismissed Alston’s complaint.  See CoreStates Bank, 176 F.3d at 194. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
1 We also affirmed the District Court’s denial of Alston’s recusal motion. 
